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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DON WEILER BENNION, Executor
of the Estate of Heber Bennion, Jr.,
VERA W. BENNION and
BENNION RANCHING COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
DUDLEY M. AMOSS and DIANA
M. AMOSS, his wife,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
13551

DAGGETT COUNTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Applicant for Intervention
and Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants-Appellants filed a motion in the District
Court of Daggett County to vacate a foreclosure sale held
on December 15, 1972, The redemptioner, Daggett
County Development Corporation, filed a motion to intervene and join in the motion to vacate the sale.
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DISPOSITION I N THE LOWER COURT
The lower court denied both the motion of Amoss
to vacate the foreclosure sale and the motion of Daggett
County Development Corporation to intervene.
RELIEF SOUGHT O N APPEAL
Appellants seek a reversal and remand to the lower
court, with directions to permit Daggett County Development Corporation to intervene as a defendant, to vacate
the foreclosure sale and to enter judgment for Appellants
for certain amounts claimed to have been paid to redeem
the property from such foreclosure sale in excess of that
required to satisfy the mortgage indebtedness.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is the fifth time this Court has been called upon
to settle differences in regard to the problems arising out
of the transactions involving the contract entered into
between Appellant Dudley M. Amoss and Respondents'
predecessor, Heber Bennion, on August 12, 1964. T h e
most recent decision of this Court was rendered December 27, 1973. Prior decisions are Amoss v. Bennion, 18
Utah 2d 251, 420 P.2d 47 (1966); Amoss v. Bennion, 23
Utah 2d 40, 456 P.2d 172 (1969); and Bennion v. Amoss,
28 Utah 2d 216, 500 P.2d 512 (1972).
Additional facts which have significance to the instant matter are detailed below.
This instant case commenced as an action to foreclose a mortgage. After a considerable amount of legal
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stalling and delay on the part of Appellants Amoss, as the
record discloses, before their present counsel became involved in the case, Respondents were successful in obtaining a summary judgment on their complaint and a decree
of foreclosure on the property. Appellants thereupon
appealed to this Court which affirmed the decision of the
lower court and sent the matter back for further proceedings. (28 Utah 2d 216, 500 P.2d 512)
On November 20, 1972, the trial court duly entered
an amended decree of foreclosure (R. 14) and an order
of sale (R. 7). The sheriff's sale was set for December 15,
1972. (Tr. 3)
Appellants then filed a motion to postpone the foreclosure sale, alleging as grounds therefor that Appellants
had not been given sufficient notice of the entry of the
amended decree; that the amended decree of foreclosure
failed to provide that the mortgaged premises be divided
and sold in parcels; that it failed to apportion equitably
among the parcels of property the 800 shares of stock in
the Sheep Creek Irrigation Company; that Appellants
were prepared to pay the amount owing if given additional time to do it; and that the holding of the foreclosure
sale on December 15, 1972, instead of December 27, 1972,
* 'would not afford the Respondents any greater protection with respect to the mortgaged indebtedness, but
would require Defendants to pay a penalty of approximately $7,600.00 in order to redeem the property after the
mortgage sale." (R. 32)
Respondents' counsel filed an affidavit in opposition
to the motion in which the facts with respect to the num-
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erous delays, particularly following the decision of
Court, were outlined. (R. 23) Among other facts,
affidavit disclosed that Appellants had been given
opportunity to satisfy the judgment from the date of
Court's decision in September until December when
sale was scheduled. (R. 20-23)

this
the
the
this
the

After hearing Appellants' motion, the trial court
denied the same (R. 33); and the sale proceeded as advertised on December 15, 1972, at which time Respondents
purchased the property for $128,550.00, being the amount
of the mortgage indebtedness, including interest, attorneys
fees and costs to the date of purchase. (R. 99)
At some time during this period Appellants Amoss
(mortgagors) transferred their interest in the property to
Daggett County Development Corporation. (R. 99) Later,
at the hearing on the motion to vacate the foreclosure
sale, Respondents contended that such transfer was made
before the sheriff's sale of the property; whereas, Appellants claimed that such transfer was made subsequent to
the sheriff's sale. (Tr. 26-34) In any event, it is undisputed
that Appellants Amoss did, in fact, transfer all of their
right, title and interest in the property to Daggett County
Development Corporation prior to the redemption by
Daggett County Development Corporation from the sheriff's sale and that Appellants Amoss therefore have had
no interest in the matter since prior to December 29,
1972. (Tr. 5)
On December 29, 1972, Daggett County Development Corporation presented satisfactory evidence of its
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ownership of all the rights of the Appellants Amoss to redeem the property as permitted by Rule 69(f)(1), U.R.C.P.,
and paid to the Plaintiffs the sum of $138,691.56 as and
for the redemption of said property, which amount included the 6% penalty on the purchase price, together with
taxes and other costs which had been paid by the Plaintiffs subsequent to the purchase !>\ rhem at the sheriff's
sale. (R. 99)
Thereafter, on January V\ 1-^3, Appellants Amoss
filed in the lower court a nin^'on to xaauv the foreclosure
siile, (R. 98) This motion was heard by ih*. court in Utah
County by agreement of counsel (TV 1 ^ *>ti April 26„ 1973.
In the interim, Daggett County Development Corporation filed a motion to intervene in the case in place of the
Defendants Amoss and in support thereof submitted a
memorandum of authorities to the court, (R 98)
At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to
vacate the foreclosure sale, the court extended to counsel
the opportunity to file briefs on their respective positions.
(Tr.34)
After considering the respective briefs, the lower
court denied Appellants' Motion to Vacate Foreclosure
Sale on the following grounds:
"(a) The record, including motion to vacate foreclosure sale, does not contain sufficient ultimate
facts to require the court to vacate the sale in the
exercise of its sound discretion. Two of the grounds
set forth in the motion have been ruled upon previously, and there does not appear to be any compelling reason to modify that ruling. The remain5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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der are irregularities which may or may not have
prejudiced the defendant, depending upon the evidence, but in any event, the court holds that they
were waived by the redemption.
"(b) There is some merit in bringing litigation to
an end, and the court believes that more mischief
and inequity would result from setting aside the
sale than is alleged to have resulted from irregularities in the sale." (R. 101)
The lower court also denied the motion of Daggett
County Development Corporation to intervene as a defendant on the ground that there was no pending action
in which to intervene. (R. 101)

ISSUES
Appellants have raised three issues in their brief
which Respondents will answer under the following headings:
1. Appellants' Motion and the evidence in support
thereof were insufficient to justify granting relief.
2. The property having been redeemed from the sheriff's sale, any irregularities in the sale have been waived
and the matter is now moot.
3. The motion of Daggett County Development
Corporation to intervene was properly denied.
In addition, Respondents submit an additional point
numbered 4 to the effect that Appellants Amoss, having
assigned any interest they may have in the property to
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Daggett County Development Corporation, have no further interest in the matter and therefore no cause to complain.
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

APPELLANTS' MOTION A N D THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT THEREOF WERE INSUFFICIENT T O JUSTIFY GRANTING RELIEF.
Appellants' motion to vacate foreclosure sale was
founded on the following arguments: (1) lack of notice
sufficient to interest other bidders; (2) not made in accordance with law in that it was not sold in parcels; (3) the
sheriff refused to accept a bid with 10% down and the
balance in the future; (4) requiring the sale to be held at
that time was oppressive and unconscionable; (5) the
property was sold for less than its value; and (6) the property having been redeemed, it would be equitable to require Respondents to refund the penalty required to be
paid.
Points (1), (4) and (6) are not raised or argued in
Appellants' brief before this Court and therefore must be
assumed to be waived. Points (2), (3), and (5) are without merit under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Sale in parcels. This point was argued to the lower
court on the initial motion to continue the sale and/or
require the property to be sold in parcels. That motion
was denied by the court and no appeal was taken from
such order. Therefore, the matter is now res judicata.

7
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In any event, in the case of Commercial Bank of Utah v.
Madsen, 120 Utah 519, 236 P.2d 343, (1951) this Court
had before it the question of whether property had to be
sold separately and held that "the fact that the land is described as Tots 1 and 2 of Block 28, Plat A Manti City
Survey' does not serve to make separate tracts of an otherwise unified parcel."
With respect to a sale as a whole as opposed to parcels, 55 AM. JUR. 2d, Mortgages, Section 649, pages 605606, states the law as follows:
"In particular cases the sale of the property as a
whole or in parcels has been regarded as proper or
improper depending largely upon the state of the
property and the circumstances. * * *
Many
cases hold that two or more tracts or lots of land
which constitute one farm or other enterprise, or
home, may be sold as a unit upon foreclosure of a
mortgage covering the property."
The Idaho Supreme Court held in Gaskill v. Neal,
also cited by Appellant, 77 Idaho 428, 293 P.2d 957, 960
(1956), that:
"The general rule is that where there is no division
of the mortgaged property into parcels adapted for
separate and distinct enjoyment, the property
should be sold as a whole, unless the party interested should show in some intelligible manner the
distinct manner in which the property might be
profitably divided for sale. 37 Am. Jur., Mortgages, Sec. 694, p. 138. N o such showing was made
or even attempted in the case now before us."
The court in Gaskill v. Neal also observed that:
"In the case of Federal Land Bank of Spokane v.
Curts, 45 Idaho 414, 262 P. 877, parcels of a farm
8
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had been sold separately, and the sheriff had ignored a much higher written bid for the entire tract.
The court set aside the sale, and said, 45 Idaho at
page 424, 262 P. at page 880:
« <* * * Since this land is contiguous, and
is owned and farmed as one tract, and there
are no peculiar marks or circumstances to
distinguish one 40-acre piece from another,
from the standpoint of use or enjoyment,
it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that it
is divided into separate known lots or parcels, requiring the officer to sell in separate
parcels. Elston v. Hix, supra [67 Mont.
294, 215 P. 6 5 7 ] / "
Section 651, 55 AM. JUR. 2d, Mortgages, states as
follows with regard to discretion of officer selling the
property:
*'Where no direction in relation to the order or
mode of sale is contained in the decree, the officer
charged with its execution is vested with discretionary power. Such discretionary power is subject to the control of the court, however. Where a
discretion is vested in the trustee or other officer
empowered to sell as a whole or in parcels, it must
be exercised in good faith for the best interests
of both the creditor and debtor; in other words,
it is his duty to sell in the mode which, in the exercise of a sound judgment and discretion, probably
will be the most advantageous.
"There are some general rules, deducible from the
cases, for the guidance of an officer having discretionary power as to the amount of property to
be sold under mortgage foreclosure and the mode
of selling the property. Thus, the general rule is
that mortgaged property which consists of several
distinct known lots, parcels, or tracts shall be first

9
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offered for sale in parcels, especially where the
debtor requests that such a mode of sale be adopted, or where the decree directs the sale of so much
of the land as is necessary to pay the debt. But this
rule, while a wholesome one, is not an arbitrary
one, and should not be enforced where there is a
valid reason for a sale of property en masse; as,
for example, where the latter mode will insure the
best prices and be most advantageous to all parties
concerned, or where the separate parcels are used
as one property and all are essential to such use,
or where the property is first offered in parcels and
no bids are received or those received are insufficient to pay the mortgage debt." (Emphasis added)
As in Gaskill v. Neal, supra, no showing was made
or even attempted in the present case that the property
might be more profitably divided for sale or that it is
adapted for separate and distinct enjoyment. (R. 20)
All of the property involved comprises one contiguous tract. (R. 20, 15) Prior to the time the property
was sold to Appellants Amoss, it was operated as one
ranching unit and was mortgaged as a unit to the Federal
Land Bank of Berkeley, on which mortgage there is still
a balance owing of $30,000.00. (R. 20) The property was
sold to Appellants Amoss as one parcel or tract and Amoss
mortgaged the same to Respondents as one entire parcel
to secure the payment of the purchase price. (R. 20) I t
would not be practicable to attempt to segregate said property or to divide the same into parcels for purposes of sale
because said property has been and is now being operated
as one integral unit. (R. 20)

10
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Price. In the case of Cole v. Canton Mining Company, 59 Utah 140, 202 P. 830, the Supreme Court discussed the effect of a sale on foreclosure as follows:
"We are not unmindful that in some jurisdictions,
under similar circumstances, no sale could have
been consummated until after a confirmation by
the court ordering the sale. Such is not the practice in our jurisdiction, but sale proceedings, and
the rights of parties under them, are fixed, and in
the absence of gross irregularities, mistake, fraud,
or collusion practiced on the part of the participants, a sale, when made as directed by the court,
in compliance with the statutes, must of necessity
be held valid and binding and the rights of all
interested parties fixed and determined thereby."
The court also held:
"When a lawful sale has been once consummated
at a price not grossly inadequate, as we think it was
in this instance, after full compliance with the
statutes and the orders of the court, the rights of
redemptioners when established should be equally
safeguarded, even though some other course might
increase the sum for which the property is sold.
Ontario Land Co. v. Bedford, 90 Cal. 181, 27 Pac.
39; Marstson v. White, 91 Cal. 37, 27 Pac. 588;
Power v. Larabee, 3 N.D. 502, 57 N . W . 789, 44
Am. St. Rep. 577."
Likewise, in First National Bank v. Haymond, 89 Utah
151, 57 P.2d 1401, (1936) the court discussed the right of
a mortgagee to have the property sold to satisfy the mortgage, as follows:
"Under our laws affecting the foreclosure of
mortgages, we can see no escape from the conclusion that a mortgagee is entitled to have the
mortgaged property sold under foreclosure sale,
11
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and, in the event the property does not sell for
sufficient to satisfy the mortgage debt, to have a
deficiency judgment entered in the usual way,
notwithstanding the value of the mortgaged property is in excess of the debt owing to the mortgagee.
Thus the equitable powers which the courts may
exercise at the time of confirmation in the jurisdiction from which cases are cited by appellants
may in this jurisdiction be exercised only after
sale upon proper application by the party who
claims to be injured. Moreover, to require the
mortgagee to accept the mortgaged property in
lieu of the money which the mortgagors have
agreed to pay would be to make a contract for the
parties contrary to their agreement. This the courts
may not do. Under our statutory law the mortgagor
and other parties interested in the mortgaged property are given six months after sale in which to
redeem the property sold. The redemption may be
had by paying the sale price, together with 6 per
cent interest thereon. R.S. Utah 1933, 104-37-31.
These provisions are calculated to protect from
injury the mortgagor and others who may have an
interest in the property. If the mortgagee or other
purchaser bids in the property for less than its
value, such mortgagee or purchaser may be deprived of all anticipated profit by redemption. N o r is
redemption of the mortgaged property the sole
remedy available to the mortgagor. It is quite generally held that substantial inadequacy of price,
coupled with fraud, mistake, or other unfair dealing is sufficient to justify a court of equity from
timelv motion to set aside the sale and order a resale."
With regard to inadequacy of price, the language
of this Court in Commercial Bank of Utah v. Madsen, et al,
120 Utah 519, 522-523, 236 P.2d 343, (1951), is relevant:
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"This was not a sale between a willing buyer and
a willing seller, where a fair price might have been
arrived at by bargaining. There were other factors
present: It was subject to redemption by the judgment-debtor, and to possible infirmities of title.
It is well known that purchasers at such sales are
seeking bargains, when possible, and that such a
sale will rarely bring the full market price of the
property. * * * The value of the property was
the subject of conflicting evidence, and the trial
court made the determination that the sale price
was 'consistent with the value of the property
under an execution sale/ This precludes any possibility whatever of this Court ruling that the price
paid was so disproportionate to the value as to
shock the conscience. The trial court's judgment
that the price was not inadequate is based on competent credible evidence, therefore we will not disturb it." (Emphasis added)
Also, in Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah 2d 52, 55, 337
P.2d 429 (1959), this Court held:
"The policy of the courts is to uphold judicial sales
except where they are manifestly unfair. Page v.
Commonwealth, 176 Va. 351, 11 S.E.2d 621.
Especially is this true in a state such as Utah which
has a substantial period of redemption. Parker v.
Clayton, 248 Ala. 632, 29 So.2d 139. Compare
Crane v. Bielski, 15 N.J. 342, 104 A.2d 651. This
is because courts hope that such a policy will encourage bidding at judicial sales and because it appears to be a waste of time to require a new sale
where little evidence is presented to show that the
bid price at the new sale will be any different from
the bid at the old. In the instant case defendant has
presented no evidence to show that the price was
unfair or that defendant was injured by the conduct of the sale. It follows that the trial court
ruled correctly in refusing to overturn the sale."
(Emphasis added)
13
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Cases cited in Appellants' brief are examples of inadequate prices which were so gross as to shock the conscience. Such is not the case in the instant action. In any
event, the amount of the purchase price at the sheriff's
sale is immaterial because the property was redeemed. If a
higher price had been paid, it would have required the
payment of a larger sum, including a greater penalty, to
have redeemed.
Payment in cash. Appellants cite 59 C.J.S., Mortgages* §7321, in support of their position. However, they
stop short in their quotation of the relevant passage:
"In the absence of a statute or a provision in the
mortgage to the contrary, whether or not the sale
shall be for cash has been held to be within the
discretion of the court, and such discretionary
power to sell partly on credit should be exercised
where the facts warrant such action in view of the
interests of all parties. {End of Appellants' quotation} Where the decree orders that the sale may be
made on credit, the sheriff is not authorized to
offer by advertisement to sell the property for cash
only. On the other hand, unless authorized by
statute or decree, the sale may not be made on
credit or for anything else than lawful
money."
(Emphasis added)
The simple fact of the matter is that the sheriff in
the instant action was authorized neither by statute nor
decree to sell the property in question for anything other
than lawful money, payable immediately in cash.
In view of the history of delays perpetrated by Appellants as represented in Plaintiffs' counsels' affidavit
14
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filed in the lower court (R. 23), where counsel gave Appellants every chance to produce the amount owing, from
June, 1972, until the date of the sale, it can hardly be
said that it would have been in the best interests of all
parties for the sheriff to have accepted an amount in cash
representing only 10% of the bid.
Appellants cite authorities where sales for part credit
have been upheld; however, these cases can be distinguished from the instant action on the facts.
In Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Lemmons, 155 S.E. 591 (S.C. 1930), for example, the court
merely recognized that a court of equity has discretionary
power to order sale of mortgaged premises for part cash
and part credit.
"Distressful times" was cited as the reason for overturning a lower court decision requiring cash at the foreclosure sale in the 1934 case of Federal Bank of Columbia
v. Wells, 172 S.C 1, 172 S.E. 707.
The facts in the instant action are such that the sheriff was justified in rejecting a bid of part credit and part
cash where neither decree nor statute authorized him to
do otherwise.

15
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POINT

II

THE PROPERTY HAVING BEEN REDEEMED FROM THE SHERIFF'S SALE, A N Y IRREGULARITIES I N THE SALE HAVE BEEN
WAIVED A N D THE MATTER IS N O W
MOOT.
In the case of Tanner v. Laivler, 6 Utah 2d 268, 311
P.2d 791, (1957) this Court discussed the effect of a redemption from a sheriff's sale as follows:
"We adhere to our holding that the provisions of
Rule 69(f)(5) dealing with the right of a judgment
debtor who redeems his property from the sheriff's sale in a foreclosure action gives him different
rights than if he takes an assignment of the sheriff's sale certificates. Under the above provisions
of Rule 69(f)(5), had Reichert redeemed from the
sheriff's sale as a judgment debtor and as successor
of the interest of the Lawlers, the effect of the foreclosure sale would have terminated."
The general effect of a redemption as stated in 47
AM. JUR. 2d, Judicial Sales, §348, p . 572, by the judgment debtor or his successor "restores the property to the
same condition as if no sale had been attempted."
See, also, Rule 69(f)(5), U.R.C.P., which states in
part:
"If the debtor redeems the effect of the sale is
terminated and he is restored to his estate. Upon
a redemption by the debtor, the person to whom
the payment is made must execute and deliver to
him a certificate of redemption, duly acknowledged."
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With respect to waiver or estoppel, Section 400 of 47
AM. JUR. 2d, Judicial Sales, states the law as follows:
"Persons interested in a judicial sale or the property sold may by disclaimer waive defects in such
sale, even as to its fraudulent character, and thereby estop themselves from later challenging its validity. As a general rule, any act of participation
by one for whose benefit the sale is made which
shows approval of or acquiescence in the proceedings for the sale of land, including such an act by
the beneficiaries of the decedent in cases involving
an executor's or administrator's sale, may, under
the conditions necessary to invoke waiver or estoppel, preclude him from challenging the validity of
the sale for defects short of those which would
render it a complete legal nullity. * * * Thus, an
heir who assents to a sale under a void decree, and
acts as one of the commissioners thereat, passes
in equity a good title to his share. Included in such
conduct is bidding, or redemption of or an attempt
to redeem the property.99 (Emphasis added) (47
AM. JUR. 2d, Judicial Sales, p. 611)
Cases cited in support of this statement include Hoicomb v. Boynton, 151 111. 294, 37 N.E. 1031; Miller v.
Ayers, 59 Iowa 424, 13 N . W . 436, holding that one who
deposited the amount of the debt in the clerk's office
prior to the expiration of the period of redemption affirmed the validity of the sale insofar as his redemption rights
depended on a determination of that question.
Also, in the case of French v. Kemp, 253 Mass. 75,
148 N.E. 422, the court held that where a redemption of
the property has taken place, the person redeeming is
estopped from asserting any invalidity to the sale.
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Respondents further contend that the action of Appellants Amoss' successor in interest in redeeming the
property from the sale which had brought a sufficient sum
to satisfy the amount owing so that no deficiency judgment was entered constituted a complete satisfaction of the
judgment and the matter was and now remains moot.
A case illustrating this point is Dawson v. Board of
Education of Weber County, 118 Utah 452, 222 P.2d 590,
where the plaintiff brought an action against the Board
of Education of Weber County and certain individuals
to recover for damages suffered by him by reason of the
unlawful death of his nine-year-old son. Judgment was
entered in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant Carr
after a jury verdict, but in favor of the defendant Bingham and against plaintiff. The plaintiff thereupon appealed from the judgment insofar as the defendant Bingham was concerned but subsequent to the judgment accepted payment from the defendant Carr for the amount
of the judgment rendered against him. On motion to dismiss the appeal, the Supreme Court stated (quoting from
AM. JUR., Vol. 31, paragraph 873):
"The general rule is that actual payment of a judgment in full to a person authorized to receive it
operates as a discharge thereof whether the payment is made by the judgment debtor himself or
by one of several judgment debtors, or by another
in his behalf. This rule prevails at law."
Seer also, Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 4, Sec.
886.
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Respondents further contend that by redeeming the
property from the sheriff's sale, the Appellants' successor
in interest accepted the benefits of the judgment and therefore cannot complain of it. It is well recognized that a
party cannot accept the benefits of a judgment or decision
and then appeal from it. See 4 AM. JUR. 2d, Appeal &
Error, Section 250, where the following appears:
"A party who accepts an award or legal advantage
under an order, judgment, or decree ordinarily
waives his right to any such review of the jurisdiction as may again put in issue his right to the benefit which he has accepted. This is so even though
the judgment, decree, or order may have been generally unfavorable to the appellant."
W e see no way that Appellant Amoss can now complain
of the sale, in view of the foregoing.

POINT

III

THE MOTION OF DAGGETT COUNTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION T O INTERVENE WAS PROPERLY DENIED.
W h a t has been heretofore stated with respect to the
merits of the motion to set aside the sheriff's sale apply
with equal force to Daggett County Development Corporation as to Appellants Amoss. In addition, Daggett
County Development Corporation has failed to establish
any basis for intervention.
As stated by counsel for Daggett County Development Corporation in his brief, intervention in an action
is governed by Rule 24, U.R.C.P. However, there was and
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is no action pending before the court in which intervention is possible. The matter has been completely adjudicated, the property sold and redeemed and as stated heretofore, the judgment satisfied. If the Development Corporation, after taking an assignment from Appellants Amoss
of their interest in the property, had any objection to the
amount which it was required to pay to redeem, it could
have followed the procedure outlined in Rule 69(f)(3)
which authorizes the person seeking redemption to "pay
the amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in
dispute, to the court out of which execution or order authorizing the sale was issued, and at the same time file with
the court a petition setting forth the item or items demanded to which he objects, together with his grounds of
objection; and thereupon the court shall enter an order
fixing a time for hearing of such objections. A copy of
the petition and order fixing time for hearing shall be
served on the purchaser not less than two days before the
day of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the
court shall enter an order determining the amount required for redemption."
Daggett County Development Corporation not only
failed to take advantage of the foregoing provision, it paid
the full amount requested without protest and did nothing
further until after the lower court had held the hearing on
the motion of Appellants Amoss to set aside the sheriff's
sale — approximately four months after the redemption
had been made.
In no way can it be said that Daggett County Development Corporation has brought itself within the provisions of either Rule 24(a) (relating to intervention as a
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matter of right) or Rule 24(b) (relating to permissive intervention).

POINT

IV

APPELLANTS AMOSS, HAVING ASSIGNED
ANY INTEREST THEY MAY HAVE IN THE
PROPERTY T O DAGGETT COUNTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, HAVE N O
FURTHER INTEREST IN T H E MATTER
A N D THEREFORE N O CAUSE T O COMPMJN.
Inasmuch as this is an action to foreclose a mortgage
and there has been no attempt to take a deficiency judgment against Appellants Amoss, Appellants have no further interest in the litigation since they have long since
assigned their interest in the property to Daggett County
Development Corporation.
Whether such assignment was made before or after
the sale appears of little significance. Appellant Dudley
Amoss was present at the sale and failed to bid in his own
right. Instead, he attempted to bid on behalf of Daggett
County Development Corporation. (R. 97) His bid, however, was not for cash but on an installment or future
payment basis which the sheriff refused. (R. 97) Respondents, on the other hand, bid the full amount of the indebtedness; and there being no other or better bids, it was
accepted. (R. 97)
It seems odd that Appellant Dudley Amoss would bid
for Daggett County Development Corporation unless he
had already assigned his interest to such corporation; but
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certainly after doing so, he cannot now come in this Court
in the same action and claim any irregularity in the sale.
Cases cited in Appellants' brief in support of right
to appeal have reference to the payor's or judgment debtor's right to appeal and are not persuasive in the present
case where the judgment debtor assigned his right to redeem, and redemption by the assignee has already taken
place.
SUMMARY
W e respectfully submit that the motion of Appellants Amoss to set aside the sheriff's sale was properly
denied, and the motion of Daggett County Development
Corporation to intervene was likewise properly denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Arthur H . Nielsen
Randall L. Romrell
NIELSEN, CONDER, HANSEN
A N D HENRIOD
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for
Plaintiffs-Respondents
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